




THE subject of trial by impeachment has recently assumed
extraordinary importance. As it is a topic which lies beyond
the ordinary range of legal study (this mode of trial being rarely
exercised and practically dormant), I have thought it well to seize
upon the factitious interest which at present attends it, to make
some impression upon your minds. Although the knowledge of this
subject is but of comparatively little direct advantage to a law
student, yet it is not altogether without its uses, as it sheds light
upon some prominent historical questions, and gives to the
biographies of some of the most eminent men of England a
tragic and pathetic interest. Circumstances also tend to show
that impeachment will be more prominent in politics than formerly,
so that new reasons for comprehending the subject are now pre-
senting themselves.
The Constitution of the United States simply refers to the
subject of impeachment without deffning it. It assumes the
existence of this mode of trial in the law, and silently points us
to English precedents for knowledge of details. We are reminded
of the statement, so often considered before, that "the constitu-
I This article was prepared by Prof. Tnno. W. DwIGHT, as a lecture to the
students of the Columbia College Law School, New York, and we have thought
that the interest in the subject at the present time would make it specially acceptable
to the profession.-EDs. A. L. R.
VOL. XY.-17 (257)
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tion is an instrument of enumeration, and not of definition."
This consideration serves to point out the difficulty and delicacy
of the subject. The precedents to be examined are scattered
over numerous volumes of state trials, or are collected in ill-
arranged and now-forgotten treatises. They were rendered
during the excitements of the most heated party contests; they
were produced under the inflammatory harangues of demagogues
and party leaders; interest, fear, and faction operated upon the
minds of the court, which, though an august tribunal, is easily
bwayed, or at least affected, by the influences which beset a
legislative assembly, of a kind unfavorable to the calmness of
judicial action. Add to this that the case has but a single dis-
cussion. In all our ordinary judicial proceedings we have courts
rising one above another in rank, in which repeated discussions
are had, and a wide opportunity is given for the detection of
errors and the rectification of mistakes of judgment. But in the
grave questions decided on an impeachment, a single tribunal
disposes of the question absolutely and for all time. It is doubt-
ful whether there is any power to reverse a judgment once pro-
nounced, though the court itself is convinced of its mistake.
There should be no reversal, of course, when the criminal has been
once acquitted.1
With these introductory remarks, I proceed to a consideration
of the topics of the lecture.
It will be discussed under four principal divisions:-
I. THE NATURE OF AN IMPEAOHMENT.
1-. THE CRIMES FOR WHICH THIS MODE OF PROSECUTION MAY
BE RESORTED TO.
III. THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE.
IV. GENERAL REMARKS.
I. The Nature of an Impeachment.-When a criminal act has
been committed, it may evidently be regarded in three aspects:
first, the injury to the individual or his family may be considered;
second, the wrong to the executive officer charged with the
I A singular embarrassment arose in the trial of Attorney-General Herbert.
The House of Lords had resolved that the Attorney-Generalshould not lose that
-office. At a subsequent stage of the proceedings they resolved that he be incapable
of holding any office whatever, except the one he now holds, though it was for
-misconduct in that office for which he was impeached: 4 How. S. T. 129.
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administ'ation of the laws may be looked at ; and, third, the mind
may dwell upon the general wrong done to the state or "the
people," as we say in modern times. This view was early taken
in the common law; the injury to the individual was redres.e l
by a proceeding called an appeal; the injury to the king, by a
process called an indictment; the wrong to the entire nation, by
a proceeding termed an impeachment. In process of time the
injury to the individual came to be regarded as a private and
not as a public wrong, so that in the progress of the law there
remained two great criminal proceedings-indictment and im-
peachment. 1
The relation of these proceedings to Magna Charta may be
briefly noticed. It will be remembered that the leading provision
of that instrument is that no freeman shall be deprived of his
life, liberty, or property, except by the judgment of his peers
and the law of the land. These words only apply to a proceed-
ing on the part of the king, and do not affect one on the part
of the nation. In other words, they have reference to criminal
proceedings in ordinary courts of justice, and have nothing to do
with the process of impeachment: 2 Hallam's Const. Hist. 445.
The United States Constitution, following the same idea, provides
that the trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment shall be
by jury.
It will tend to a clearer understanding of our subject if the
resemblances and contrasts of an indictment and impeachment be
carefully pointed out. An indictment is a presentment in writing
by a body of men not less in number than twelve nor more than
twenty-three, of crimes committed within their own county. This
presentment is made in an ordinary court of justice, e. g. the
King's Bench. Its only effect is to pronounce the opinion of a
majority of these men (grand jury) that there is apparent reason
to believe that there has been a criminal violation of the law of
the land by the person against whom the indictment is found.
He is therefore arrested, and either held in custody or required
to find sufficient security to await his trial. Notwithstanding his
indictment, the law still presumes his innocence, and takes no
action against him except that which is necessary to secure his
IIt is said in 8 How. S. T. 231, that one and the same offence may entitle
several persons to several remedies; as in murder, at common law the king may
indict, or the heir or wife of the murdered party may appeal.
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attendance at the trial. Anything more than this, any depriva-
tion of property, any forfeiture of his civil rights, -while the
indictment is pending, is wholly opposed to the genius and spirit
of the common law. The indictment in due course of law is
brought on to trial before an assigned term of the criminal court.
The case must now be presented to a trial-jury presided over by
a judge. The government who has in charge the criminal must,
notwithstanding the indictment, overcome the presumption of the
prisoner's innocence; and only by the superiority of its proofs
can a verdict be obtained against the prisoner. When judgment
is entered upon the verdict, for the first time commence the
penalties and forfeitures of the law. The convicted criminal
may lose his property, his liberty, or life, as the result of the
proceeding. It is thus seen that an indictment is nothing more
than a method of trial established to introduce solemnity, delibera-
tion, and caution into judicial proceedings. It pre-supposes the
existence and definition of crimes. It is a method of trial, and
nothing more.
If we now recur to an impeachment, it will be found that it,
too, is a presentment by a body of men that a crime has been
committed. It is no longer a presentment by a small number
of twenty-three men, but of the entire House of Commons,
representing the state which is supposed to have been injured.
It, too, is made in writing under the name of Articles of Impeach-
ment. The tribunal before wvhom the articles are brought is a
court of justice, not the ordinary court, it is true, but still a
court composed of the members of the House of Lords. It may
entertain a presentment for any crime, whether it be a felony or
misdemeanor, whether it be committed by a peer or commoner,
'And mawr attach to conviction the ordinary punishments.' As a
matter of course, an impeachment is not confined to a particular
county, as an indictment is, but the House of Commons may
present cases arising anywhere within their jurisdiction. For
this reason, impeachments were sometimes resorted to, because
if treason were committed in Scotland or Ireland by an English-
man, though it might not be triable in an ordinary criminal court
in England, as it was not committed in an English county, it is
I Though Blackstone controverts the opinion that a commoner may be impeached
for a crime such as treason, yet the weight of authority and reason is overwhelmh-
ingly opposed to this view. See 2 HaIlam's Const. Hist. 445, Best. ed. 1854.
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still under the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. Thus Lord
Lovat, who, while in Scotland, was concerned iiL the rebellion
of 1745, was impeached, as he had committed no overt act of
treason in England so as to bring the case before' an English
jury: 5 Campbell's Lord Chancellors 106. His co-conspirators
in England were indicted and not impeached.
The effect of an impeachment, like that of an indictment, is
simply that there is apparent reason to believe that there has
been a criminal violation of the laws by the individual impeached.
He may in proper cases be arrested and held in custody or re-
quired to give security. The law still presumes his innocence,
and can do no more than to take such steps as may be necessary
to render his attendance at the trial certain. The trial must be
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence observed in
the ordinary courts; the person impeached can only be convicted
of a crime known to the law; the punishment follows that at-
tached to the same crime by the ordinary courts. Forfeiture of
rights can only occur after conviction. Impeachments, like in-
dictments, are methods of procedure in criminal cases, and
nothing more.'
The proceeding by impeachment being purely judicial, it must
be distinguished from a Bill of Attainder and of Pains and
Penalties. These must be regarded as pure legislative acts.
The two houses then enact that a particular person is guilty of a
crime. They may sometimes go through certain forms of judicial
inquiry, but their decision is a law, not a judgment.. Such bills
are in utter violation of the principles of true constitutional
government, as they confound legislative with judicial power.
An impeachment is decided by the House of Lords alone. Any
attempt on the part of the House of Commons to participate in
this judicial power has always been highly resented by the House
of Lords, and would not now be claimed.'
"Impeachments are but a method of trying offences," 15 How. S. T. 68.
"An impeachment is a course of proceeding for treason the same as in case of
grand jury, which is another method," 15 Id. 795. ' They (impeaclhnent and
indictment), differ in point of form," Id. 886. "Impeachment is in the nature
of an indictment. There must be a ,ufficient statement to bring the accused to
plead and not to demur," per Fi~icii, 6 Id. 354. Such is the language of many
authorities.
2 In lood's Case, 2 How. S. T. 1156, the House of Lords resolved that the
Commons had no power of judicature-no coercion against any but in matters
concerning their own houme.
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It is also important to distinguish an impeachment from a trial
before the " Court of the Lord High Steward." The office of
this court is briefly this: whenever a peer is indicted in the ordi-
nary courts, in order that his case might be removed thence to be
tried by his " peers," a commission was issued by the king to a
particular nobleman to act as judge (Lord High Steward). Such
other peers as the king thought fit to name, not less than twelve
in number, were associated with the Lord High Steward to act as
triors of the questions of fact, or as jurors. It is substantially a
court of commission of oyer and terminer; the High Steward
decides the law; the other peers try the fact: 4 Hatsell's Pre-
cedents 278. This court differs from a court of impeachment in
three respects : first, it only tries an indictment found by a grand
jury in a county; second, it may, and perhaps now must, be held
during a recess of Parliament; third, it may, at -common law,
consist of a number less than the whole House of Peers. The
king might resort to this tribunal to ruin a hated nobleman, as he
could pack it with his own creatures. It was for this reason that
the great Earl of Clarendon fled from England, because he learned
that Charles II. intended to bring him before the Court of the
Lord High Steward.1
It is the more important to distinguish the Court of Impeach-
ments from that of the Lord High Steward, as the president of
the former court in capital cases is called by the same name. It
is therefore easy to confound cases in the two courts, unless care
is taken to observe the distinctions which have been pointed out.
The result is, that there are in general by the English common
law two parallel modes of reaching a particular criminal: he may
either be indicted or impeached. "If he is indicted first he may
be impeached afterwards, and the latter trial may proceed not-
withstanding the indictment.- On the other hand, the King's
Bench held in Pitzharris's Uase, that an impeachment was no
answer to an indictment in that court.
I The statute of 7 Win. I., c. , prevented the packing of the court in cases of
treason and misprision of treason by requiring the whole number of peers to be
summoned at such trials.
2Thus in Stafford's Trial, the Lord High Steward said, "You are not tried
upon the indictment of treason found by the grand jury, though that too be in the.
case. You are prosecuted and pursued by the loud and dreadful complaint of the
Commons, and are to be tried on the presentment made by the grand jury of be
whole nation :" 7 How. S. T. 1297.
TRIAL BY IMPEACIIMENT.
It may be asked, why, then, is the cumbrous prncess of im-
peachment ever resorted to ? The answer is, that there were
often found in England persons who could not readily be tried by
the common law courts, either owing to an influence which over-
shadowed the ordinary tribunals, or because technical rules of
practice made the usual remedies scarcely worth pursuing.
Moreover, impeachment was often adopted as an instrument of
faction, and was especially active when society was disturbed by
party contests or was in the throes of a revolution. In fact,
through this process, Parliament ultimately triumphed over the
executive, and parliamentary government with ministers respon-
sible to the Commons for executive acts was formed.
When the United States constitution was- framed, trial by
impeachment was fully developed. It was not, however, adopted
in that instrument as a regular mode of criminal procedure, to be
employed in lieu of an indictment. It was made a means of trial
of a crime so far as it had a political bearing. it is used as a
means of depriving officers o- their offices and of disqualifying
them from holding such pos; ns in the future. Still it is requi-
site that a crime should be. aitted as a basis for the accusation.
The constitution provides, in sabstance, that the offence, so far as
it has a purely criminal aspect, shall be tried in the ordinary
courts ; while so far as it affects the official character, it shall be
the subject of impeachment.' Though the English theory and
procedure still substantially continue, impeachment in our law
has a comparatively narrow scope. The House of Representatives,
in analogy to the English House of Commons, has the exclusive
power of impeachment, and the judicial power is vested in the
Senate, in analogy to its deposit in the House of Lords.
II. The crimes for which an impeaehment may be had.-Upon
this topic it is important to make two.inquiries: first, what were
the subjects under the English law which could be tried by
impeachment; second, what cases under our system can be tried
n this manner.
In examining the first question, it must be conceded that the
."dgments of the courts are not absolutely uniform. This could
nardly be expected, both because there is no system of appeal by
I This wise provision is traceable to the N. Y. Gons. of 1777, and probably ti-
the pen of John Jay.
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means of which authoritative precedents could be established, and
because the House of Lords has been at times impelled by faction
or overborne by importunity or overawed by fear. The weight
of authority is therefore to be followed. So said the great Selden,
in a speech which he made as one of the committee of the House
in the impeachment of Ratcliffe. "It were better to examine
this matter according to the rules and foundations of this House
than to rest upon scattered instances :" 4 How. S. T. 41. The
decided weight of authority is, that no impeachment will lie
except for a true crime, or, in other words, for a breach of the
common or statute law, which, if committed within any county of
England, would be the subject of indictment or information.
This proposition is plainly inferred from the doctrine already
established, that impeachment is simply a method of procedure.
It presupposes the existence of the crime for the redress of which
a trial is instituted. What would have been the check upon the
most arbitrary action of the House of Lords, if it might decide
the existence of a common-law crime without reference to already
settled rules ? This tribunal was only rarely called to act--during
the reign of the Tudor family its functions were entirely sus-
pended. The rules of the common-law courts were in daily dis-
cussion and exercise. The fundamental distinction between felo-
nies and misdemeanors was fully recognised by the House of
Lords in cases of impeachment. It is asserted, without fear of
successful contradiction, both upon authority and principle, not-
withstanding a few isolated instances apparently to the contrary,
that no impeachment can be had where the King's Bench would
not have held that a crime had been committed, had the case been
properly before it. There are no doubt extreme cases favoring an
ppposite view. Thus, the Duke of Richmond was impeached in
1641, among other frivolous charges, on the ground that he had
proposed an adjournment while a member of the House of Lords.
The Commons were so offended with him for attempting to check
the enactment of a bill which they had much at heart, that they
accompanied the impeachment with a petition to the king to
remove the duke from all offices of public trust, in which petition
the Lords refused to join: 4 How. S. T.. 120. This is but the
excess of the lower House, resolved that no obstacle shall stand
in the way of its shortest path to its destined goal. In early
times a quarrel between great noblemen excited the interest of
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the public to such an extent, that the matter was brought up for
disposition in Parliament. In such a feud between the Bishop
of Winchester and the Duke of Gloucester (A. D. 1451), there
was a formal award of acquittal of the party accused, and the
Lords "enjoined them to be firm friends for the future, and by
such inducements wrought upon them that they shook hands, and
parted with all outward signs of love and agreement * *
which gave a mighty satisfaction to all people :" 1 How. S. T.
152. Perhaps no more ingenious plan has been devised to settle
the strifes of embittered politicians, since, while it soothes the
spirit, it secures notoriety.
A strong instance of the exercise of a broad power of impeach-
ment is found in the last charge of a series made by the Commons
against one of the worthless judges of Charles IL's reign, Oh. J.
SCROGGS. Its words are: "Whereas, said W. Scroggs being
advanced to be chief justice of the Court of King's Bench, ought
by a sober, grave, and virtuous conversation, to have given a
good example to the King's liege people, and to demean himself
answerable to the dignity of so eminent a station; yet he, the
said Sir W. Scroggs, on the contrary, by his frequent and notori-
ous excesses and debaucheries, and his profane and atheistical
discourses, doth daily affront Almighty God, dishonor his Majesty,
give countenance and encouragement to all manner of vice and
wickedness, and bring the highest scandal on the public justice
of the kingdom." This was an article in an impeachment for
high treason! The articles were never tried, so that they only
serve to show how far the doctrine of" constructive treason" may
be pushed by ingenious committees: 13 Lords Journals 737.
The danger of a loose construction of the judicial power of a
legislative body was most strikingly shown when the House of
Commons during the revolution, in consequence of the abolition
of the House of Lords, had centered within it both the power of
impeachment and the power of trial. At the trial of James Nay-
lor, an insane ranter, who would now be sent to a lunatic asylum,
there was a large minority voting to put him to death for blas-
phemy. The majority prevailed by deciding to whip him, set him
in the pillory, bore his tongue through with a hot iron, and to con-
fine him in Bridewell at hard labor.
Undoubtedly some cases which at the present time appear inex-
plicable on any sound theory, depended on a construction of
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statutes now forgotten, or upon a violation of official oaths, or a
perverted application of legal rules to instances not properly
governed by them. Thus, a prominent citizen of London was
impeached for presenting a petition to Parliament, which now
seems quite harmless ; but it was asserted to be a seditious libel,
and consequently criminal: 4 How. S. T. 152.
While the irregular cases upon this subject are few, the rule
that a true crinie must have been committed is settled beyond
dispute. This is clearly shown by the way in which the House
of Commons when flushed with power or chafed with indignation
rebel against it. Over and over again they assert that the great
statute of 25 Edw. III., defining treason, is not applicable to trial by
impeachment. They plausibly maintained that the statute was
only for the courts of ordinary criminal justice; and that the
statute itself applied a different rule to trial by impeachment.
But the law was settled after the most extended and prolonged
discussion in favor of the doctrine that the court of impeachment
must administer the same law as the criminal court: 12 How. S.
T. 1213; 6 Id. 346. Thus the Earl of Orrery was not tried in
A. D. 166 ,, as the offence charged was thought not sufficient to
constitute treason, and the case was directed to be heard in a
court of law: 1 6 How. S. T. 917.
The stringency of these rules often led the Houses, when under
excitement, to pass Bills of Attainder. They could enact that an
obnoxious person was guilty,- if they could not prove his offence.
This course was resorted to in the well-known case of the Earl of
Strafford. So, too, when the Earl of Clarendon in Charles II.'s
time could not be successfully impeached, the king intended to
bring him before the Court of the Lord High Steward, which
could be-organized so as to secure a conviction: 3 Campbell's
Lord Chancellors 243-4, Lond. ed. 1848.-
The later and most authoritative decisions are clear to this
effect. In the impeachment of the Earl 6f Macclesfield, who was
a great lawyer and at one time Lord Chancellor, the case was put
exclusively on such criminality as is the subject of an indictment.
It was argued that he had violated the statute of 6 Ed. VI., c. 16,
1 In the case of Inigo Jones, against whom a charge was made of pulling down
a church, the Commons refused to impeach on the ground that it was a matter of
private right: 4 Hatsells Precedents 132.
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concerning the administration of justice, while he rested his
defence on the fact, that it was not criminal for a judge to receive
presents either by common or statute law. The decision of this
case against Macclesfield is criticised by Lord Mahon and others,
but is defended by Campbell, on the ground that the statute of
Ed. VI. was violated: 16 How. S. T. 823 ; 4 Camp. Lord Chan.
586. This is one of the best-considered cases on the subject, and
preceded the formation of our Constitution by only a few years.
The last case of impeachment in England, that of Lord Melville
in 1806 for malversation in office, is very instructive. The ques-
tion was put to the judges whether the acts with which he was
charged were unlawful so as to be the subject of information or
indictment. It having been decided that they were not, Lord
Melville was acquitted: 29 How. S. T. 1470. These last two
decisions, made when there was an entire absence of party feeling
and the court acted throughout with judicial impartiality, de-
servedly outweigh scores of instances, if they could be produced,
which have occurred in the heat and frenzy of a revolution.
The court in general relies with close dependence upon the
opinion of the common-law judges on the law of crime and crimi-
nal evidence, often exacting their continuous attendance to the
detriment of other public business
The text-writers and leading jurists are of the same opinion.
Says Wooddeson: "The trial differs not in essentials from crimi-
nal prosecutions before inferior courts. The same rules of evi-
dence, the same legal notions of crimes and punishments, prevail.
For impeachments are not framed to alter the law, but to carry it
into more effectual execution where it might be obstructed by the
influence of too powerful delinquents or not easily discerned in
the courts of ordinary jurisdiction by reason of the peculiar
quality of the alleged crimes. The judgment thereof is to be
such as is warranted by legal principles or precedents :" Lec-
tures, vol. 2, p. 611. So Cushing, in his "Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies," says: "The proceedings are conducted
I In Lord Clarecndon's Case, the Lords inquired of the judges if there was any
treason. As they answered in the negative, it was so decided: 4 Hatsell's Prece-
dents 153-4; .eo aiso opinion in the Case of the Earl of Daniby, Id. 18O. In
Warren Hastngjs' Trial, the Lords consulted the judges on nearly every point of
evidence that arose: 4 Id. 282. The judges were ordered to attend Dr. Sucheercrel's
Trial till it wa. over, but afterwards three of their number-were pernitted to pro-
ceed on their ireuit: Id. Their opinion was asked on the merits of the case.
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substantially as they are upon common judicial trials as to the
admission or rejection of testimony, the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, and the legal doctrines as to crimes
and misdemeanors :" § 2569. Lord Chancellor COWPER, in an
impeachment case not long before our revolution (A. D. 1715),
said: "Though one of your Lordships supposes this impeachment
to be out of the ordinary and common course of law and justice,
it is yet as much a course of proceeding according to the common
law as any other whatever. If you had been indicted, the indict-
ment must have been removed and brought before the House of
Lords, Parliament sitting. In that case, it is true, you had been
accused by the grand jury of one county; in the present, the
whole body of the commons of Great Britain by their representa-
tives are your accusers :" 4 Hatsell 295.
The framers of the New York Constitution of A, D. 1777 held
this view, for they couple together in the same sentence, impeach-
ments and indictments, as though they were only modes of trial.
"In every trial on impeachment or indictment for crimes or mis-
demeanors, the party impeached or indicted shall be allowed
counsel as in civil actions :" Art. 34.1
I have dwelt the longer on this point because many seem to
think that a public officer can be impeached for a mere act of
indecorum. On the contrary, he must have committed a true
crime, not against the law of England but against the law of the
United States. As impeachment is nothing but a mode of trial,
the Constitution only adopts it as a mode of procedure, leaving
the crimes to which it is to be applied to be settled by the general
rules of criminal law.
A bqsis for a very important conclusion has now been laid. It
.is this:. as there are under the laws of the United States no
common-law crimes, but only those which are contrary to some
positive statutory rule, there can be no impeachment except for a
violation of a law of Congress or for the commission of a crime
I Says Blackstone, 'c An impeachment is a prosecution of the already known
and established law :" 4 Com. 259. The judges were of opinion in Lord ClUren-
don's Case, that the evidence on an impeachment must be the same as on an indict-
ment: 6 How. S. T. 514. Mr. Webster has well expounded the whole subject in
his speech in defence of Judge Prescott. Though he made an argument as counsel,
yet his remarks on this point are carefully elaborated and characterized by great
precision of statement. Webster's Works, Vol. 5, pp. 513-515.
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named in the constitution. English precedents concerning im-
peachable crimes are consequently not applicable.
There was for a long time a fluctuation of opinion on the point
whether the common law crimes did not exist under the general
government. Justice Story lent the great weight of his influence*
to the opinion in favor of their existence. His discussion of the
subject of impeachment rests upon this view. Mr. Rawle is of
the same opinion. Both of these eminent writers admit that if
there arc no common-law crimes for which indictments can be
brought, there are none for which impeachments can be instituted.
'Air. Rawle is especially clear upon this point. "The doctrine
that there is no law of crimes except that founded in statutes
renders impeachment a nullity in all cases except the two expressly
mentioned in the constitution, treason and bribery, until Congress
shall pass laws declaring what shall constitute the other high
crimes and misdemeanors :" Rawle on the Constitution, p. 278,
ed. 1829 ; Story on the Constitution, title "Impeachment."
That there are no crimes- against the United States which are
not statutory, is fully proved by a great number of cases collected
by Mr. Wharton in his work on Criminal Law. Though he dis-
sents from this view, he acknowledges that it is settled by the
decisions: §§ 163-174. The decisions of the Senate, as a court
of impeachment, should not be regarded as adverse to this view.
In the three cases already tried, of Pickering, Chase, and Blount,
only one, Pickering, was condemned. His case was heard
ex parte, as he did not appear, and was decided by a strict party
vote: 2 Hildreth's History 518. As far as precedent is con-
cerned, the question in that court is still open and should be
decided in accordance with principle.'
The result is, that unless the crime is specifically named in the
constitution, impeachments like indictments can only be instituted
for crimes committed against the stgtutory law of the United
States.
III. The method of procedure.
It will not be necessary to go into special detail upon this
I See, among other cases, I Wash. C. C. 84; U. S. v. Mfaurice, 2 Brock- 96;
U. S. v. N. Bedford Bridge, I Woodb. & Minot 401; U. S. v. Lancaster, 2
McLean 431.
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subject, except upon those points which involve great constitu-
tional inquiries. There are, however, some topics connected with
this matter of vast practical importance, such as the right to sus-
pend an officer from his office while the trial is in progress.
While other points connected with procedure will be briefly
alluded to, it is intended to treat the one in question with a ful-
ness justified by its importance.
When an impeachment has been resolved upon, a member usu-
ally rises in his place in the House of Commons, and makes a
charge of crime which he supports by proofs and moves for an
impeachment. If such is the determination, the member in ques-
tion is ordered to go to the House of Lords in company with
others to impeach the accused. The formal articles of impeach-
ment are subsequently prepared. This course, however, was
deviated from in the impeachment of Warren Hastings, and that
of Elijah Tmpey (Dec. 1787), in which instances ca member of the
House presented at once from his place formal articles of im-
peachment. In this country, the impeachment is commonly
brought forward by report of a committee to whom the matter
has been previously referred.
The most important points connected with procedure are arrest
and suspension. These questions do not appear to have been
anywhere systematically considered, and will be discussed
separately.
The subject of arrest under the English system is of great con-
sequence, as it secures the attendance of accused parties to abide
the event of a proceeding which may involve liberty or life.
The rules of arrest distinguish between commoners and peers.
A commoner may be arrested upon any charge; a peer can only
be required to appear as a criminal in the case of high treason or
other capital cause.' The Commons may arrest in the first in-
stance, and in a proper case hold the accused to bail ;2 when the
prisoner has been delivered to the House of Lords, that body has
the control and may admit to bail if the case justifies it.
3
15 How. S. T. 806; Id. 1170; 14 Id. 240, 287.
2 4 Hat.sell's Precedcnts 256.
3 15 How. S. T. 20; Dr. Sacheverell's Case, 4 Hatsell 265; Commons' Journal,
22 Dec. 1709. A form of recognisance of bail is found in Lords' Journals, 22
and 23 licc. 1640, 4 Hatscll 128. The Commons often interfered with the discre-
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The must stringent measures of arrest have 1;_:- somavtimes
resorted to. une of them is thus described: " 'ax1%ell (the
officer of the court) came to the King's Bench where the judges
were sitting, took Judge Berkley off the beiich and carried him
away to prison; which struck a great terror in the rest of his,
brethren then sitting in Westminster Hall, and in all his pro-
fession:" Whitelocke's Memorials, p. 39.
In the United States system of impeachment, no arrest is
necessary. If the accused when properly summoned does not
appear, the case may be heard and judgment rendered in his
absence. The punishments do not require any personal presence
for their administration, and they cannot be evaded by his non-
attendance.
Suspension from office.-Can the accused be suspended from
office during the progress of the trial ? This subject is of vast
importance in case of the impeachment of a President, as an
assertion of such a power might lead to the utmost confusion and
perhaps to civil war.
I strongly believe that there can be no suspension from office,
on two principal grounds: 1st, from the practice in England;
2d, from the true construction of the language of the United
States constitution.
1. The cases in the English practice admit of a threefold
classification.
(1). Impeachable crimes committed by a member of the House
of Commons.
(2). Like crimes on the part of a member of the House of
Lords.
(3). Similar charges against a person holding an administrative
or judicial office, whether a member of either House or not.
(1). An instance of the first kind is found in the impeachment
of a Sir William Penn, while he was a member of the I-louse of
Commons. He was suspended by that House from his place
1herein while the trial was going on: 6 How. S. T. 872. The
power to suspend is necessarily included in the power of expul-
sion. Accordingly, Sir John Bennett, who was a member of the
tion of the Lords. In one case, bail was allowed, then, on the remonstrance of the
Commons, refused, and afterwards allowed: 4 How. S. T. 56, 82. In one case, a
suggestiou is made to the Lords, that the gaol is the best place for the pri.ioner.
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House, and at the same time Master in Chancery and judge of a
Probate Court (Prerogative Court of Canterbury), being accused
of bribery and judicial corruption, was expelled from the House
and charges thereupon made by impeachment: 4 Hatsell 121;
14 How. S. T. 288-9. See in 8 How. S. T. 156, a like expul-
sion of one Brunckard.
(2). In cases of the second class, a distinction must be taken
between misdemeanors and felonies. In case a member of the
House of Lords is charged with a misdemeanor, he is allowed to
remain in his place, and to vote upon all matters which do not
concern the trial of the charge upon the merits: Case of the 12
Bishops, 4 Hatsell 151.
On the other hand, where the trial is for a capital crime, such
as treason, he may be sequestered from his place and kept in
close custody in the Tower or otherwise. This course has been
adopted in many instances. It will not be followed in a case of
treason unless the offence is so specially charged, that on the
perusal of the articles of impeachment, it can be seen that if the
charge is true, the offence has been committed: Eord Claren-
don's Trial, 6 How. 867.
(8). The last class of cases includes those where an officer is
charged with malversation in office. These must be separated
into two subordinate divisions: one, where the office is holden at
the king's pleasure; the other, where the tenure is certain, so
that the officer has a claim to continue in his office.
Offices held at the king's pleasure are in the main (so far as
questions have arisen), offices of trust and judicial. All that the
House of Commons ever pretended to ask in such cases was, that
the Lords should concur with them in addressing the king to
,remove *or suspend the office-holder.
An "address" is not a judicial but a-legislative act. It is in
the nature of a joint resolution. Still, no case, as I believe, can
be found in which the Lords ever consented to join with the Com-
mons to address the king, to remove or suspend a judicial or other
like officer during the course or progress of an impeachment. On
the other hand, the precedents of refusal to unite with the Com-
mons in such an address are numerous. Nor did the Lords alone
ever address.the king to that effect under the like circumstances,
although they have done so at the close of the trial. These pro-
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positions, so far as they are affirmative in their nature, demand
the support of authorities.
When Lord Bacon was impeached and confessed his crime, " a
difficulty remained in proceeding further while he retained the
Great Seal; for, by the rules and customs of the House of Lords,
a defendant produced before them is to receive sentence on his
knees at the bar, and the Lord Chancellor, if present, must pre-
side on the woolsack and render sentence. This embarrassment
was removed on'the 1st of May, when the king finding all further
resistance hopeless, sent the Lord Treasurer to demand the Great
Seal, which Bacon surrendered:" 2 .Camp. Lord Chan. 408,
Lond. ed. 1858. Here, we have most clearly the principle that
the Lord Chancellor could not lose or be suspended from his office
before conviction and sentence; and that the only remedy was to
address the king who appointed him. I now refer to the action
of the House of Lords, as exhibited in their journals. After
Bacon's confession, it was " agreed by the House of Lords to
move his Majesty to sequester the seal; and the Lords entreated
the Prince, his Highness, that he would be pleased to move the
king's majesty therein, whereunto his Highness condescended,
and certain lords were appointed to attend the prince to the king :"
Lords' Jour., 30th April 1621. Does this look like a power by
the Lords to suspend or remove a judicial officer before sentence ?
How can this language of entreaty and praise of condescension
be accounted for, on the theory that the power of suspension is
inherent in the Court of Impeachment?
So, when the worthless and obnoxious Scroggs was impeached,
the House of Lords refused to join the Commons, in addressing
the king to suspend him from the execution of his office: Jour.
of the Lords, vol. 13, 788; 4 Hatsell 156. The Commons were
greatly offended by this refusal, and understood it to be a positive
decision upon the point, that while an office-holder was uncon-
demned, he should not be affected in the administration of his
office. Says Sir W. Jones, " for suspending him (Scroggs) from
his place, they would not put a question." "They mean that he
shall continue in his place, notwithstanding his impeachment."
Said Sir F. Winnington: 1 For the king to sequester Scroggs from
his place, they would not address for it, but leave it to Scrogga's
modesty whether he would exercise it. or no :" 8 How. S. T.
VOL. XV.-18
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213, 214. We all know what Scroggs's modesty was; and the
likelihood that his possession of that virtue would interfere unfa-
vorably with his Iisposition to exercise judicial functions.
This case shows conclusively that one hundred years before
the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the House of Commons
had not the remotest idea that they had the power of suspension,
or that anything could be done in the case except to frame a joint
address to the king. Winnington and Jones were then as promi-
nent as Bingham and Boutwell are at WashingtoAl to-day. If the
Lords would not act in Scroggs's Case, there is no other instance
likely to happen in which they would interfere.
Again, Judge Berkley, who was impeached in 1641, in the
very heat of the English rebellion, sat as sole judge in the King's
Bench for one whole term after his impeachment. The same fact
was true of Baron Trevor, in the Court of Exchequer: 1 Claren-
don's Hist. of the Rebellion 441, Oxford ed. 1840 ; 4 Hatsell's
Prec. 173, note. This happened, too, after power bad centered
in the Commons-for Berkley was not condemned till 1643.1
Moreover, instead of claiming the exercise of the right of sus-
pension, the House often proceeded with great delicacy towards
the accused, on account of his possession of a great office. Thus,
when Lord Bacon was impeached for misconduct as Lord Chan-
cellor, it was debated whether he should be brought to the bar as
.an ordinary criminal to hear the charges against him, or that
respect being had to his person as yet having the Great Seal, the
charge should be sent in writing. It was decided that the latter
-course should be adopted: 4 Hatsell 203.
The only case known to exist, where the Lords acceded to the
prayers of the Commons in respect to non-performance of judicial
functions, is one, where there was a resolution that new judicial
duties should not be conferred upon persons impeached. In
August 1641, the Lords resolved that the "peccant" judges,
Berkley and others, should not be named in the commission for
the circuits, for that for them being thus impeached to become
judges of men's lives and estates would be a thing of great
.offence and distraction: 4 Hatsell 183.
This very Judge Berkley, as has been seen, continued to fill
S'There were only ten Lords present at his conviction.
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the office of judge to which he had been previously appointed.
Even in those cases where the Commons asked for a joint address.
they were careful to disclaim any control over the subject. Thus,
when during the progress of the revolution (A. D. 1640), they
desired the Lords to move his Majesty, that one impeached shofld
be removed from the king's service; they wish that this should
be "considered as an opinion, but not as a mulct upon him:" 4
Hatsell 129.1
The Commons contrived methods to evade the stringency of
these rules of procedure. Thus, in one case, they sought to have
the Duke of Buckingham committed to custody, as they held it
wrong that he "should have so great a post of power and sit as
a peer in Parliament." Of course no order of custody could
properly have such an effect, as bail ought to be received, except
in capital cases. The necessity ef resorting to such an artifice
only shows the unbending rigor of the rule: 2 How. S. T.
1302-5.
Thus far have been considered offices held at the pleasure of
the king. When the tenure is fixed and permanent, the case is
still stronger. In that case, the Commons will not even vote to
address the king for removal from office though no impeachment
is intended. in other words, they will not in such a case adopt
a joint resolution asking for the removal of an unpopular and
obnoxious minister, not charged with crime, though they may ask
for the dismissal of such a minister from offices held at the king's
pleasure. This distinction was strongly marked in a.discussion
concerning one of the Dukes of Buckingham (6 How. S. T.
1054). The Commons refused to address the king to remove
the duke from offices in which he had a definite or permanent
tenure, but asked that he might be removed from offices held at
I There were undoubtedly fiery orators who claimed at times much more than is
here conceded. In one case, it was asserted by a member, that, on the moment of
impeachment the accused, became civilly dead, and that therefore his offices should
be sequestered I No one else defended this extravagant and absurd view: 4 How.
S. T. 56. Sometimes, to avoid odium, the accused lowered his insignia of office.
Thus, when Lord Middlesex, at the time Lord Treasurer, appeared to answer to an
impeachment, it was noticed and recorded by the reporter, that he did not have his
staff in his hand as Lord Treasurer: 2 Id. 1119. This was no doubt a measure of
policy, while retaining the substance of power, to avoid an irritating exhibition
of it.
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the king's pleasure. There was in this case no impeachment.
But, immediately afterwards, having resolved to impeach the
Earl of Arlington, they refused an address for removal from
any office. There is good reason for the difference of action in
the two cases; where there is no charge of crime, the king may
be asked to withdraw his favor; where a crime is alleged, the
withdrawal of patronage tacitly admits the charge, and exposes.
the accused to a loss of reputation, and may diminish the reason-
able chances for an acquittal
2. Suspension from office under the United States Clonsti-
tution.
Where an officer, like the President, holds his office by a
certain tenure, the people, according to the principles of law,
have a right to his continuous services, of which they cannot be
deprived before his- conviction for an impeachable offence, unless
there is something in the language of the constitution which con-
fers the power of suspension by express words or necessary impli-
cation. If the officer holds at the pleasure of the appointing
power, he may, of course, be arbitrarily removed by the person
exercising the power of appointment.
There is no express language in the constitution conferring the
power of suspension. There is no necessary implication, because
it has" been shown by English practice that the power to impeach
does not involve the power to suspend.
It is well, however, to go further than this. I maintain that
the history of the constitution, the debates upon it, and contem-
porary documents, plainly show that the power of suspension vas
studiously exduded.
In proof of this proposition, I cite, among other documents,
the New York Constitution of 1777. It is well known that this
instrument was drawn by an eminent lawyer, Mr. Jay, afterwards
chief justice of the United States. But few lawyers then under-
stood the subject of impeachment.' It is clear, however, that it
was thoroughly comprehended in its leading features by Jay, and
I John Adams, speaking of this subject, says, that in 1774 there was only one
copy of the State Trials and Selden's Tract on "The Judicature of Parliament,"
in Boston, and, as he telieves, not another copy in the United States: 10 Adams'
Works 238-9.
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the clauses in the Constitution of the United States wer, largely
taken verbatim from his draft. Note their correspondeice.
NEW YORK CONSTITUTION or 1777.
"The power of impeaching all offi-
cers of the state for venal and corrupt
conduct in their respective offices
[shall] be vested in the representative&
of the people in assembly. *** Pre-
vious to the trial of every impeach-
ment, the members of the said court
[Senate, &c., described in 32d Article]
shall be respectively sworn truly and
impartially to try and determine the
charge, according to evidence. No
judgment of the said, court shall be
valid unless it shall be assented to by
two-thirds part of the members then
present, nor 'shall it extend further
than to removal from qffice and dis-
qualfication to'hold or enjoy any place
of honor, trust, or profit under this
state. But the party so convicted'
shall be nevertheless liable and subject
to indictment, trial, judgment, and
punishment, according to the laws
of the laud:' Art. 33.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The House of Representatives shall,
have the sole power of impeachment:
Art. 1, 2, Subd. 5.
The Senate shall have the sole
power to try all impeachments.
When sitting for that purpose, they
shall be on oath or affirmation. * **
No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members present. Judgment in cases
of impeachment shall not extend fur-
ther than to removal from office and
disqualfication to hold and enjoy any
office of honor, trust, or profit under
the United States; but the party can-
victed shall nevertheless be liable and.
subject to indictment, trial, judgment,
and punishment according to law:
Art. 1, & 3, Subd. 6, 7.
It will be perceived that the variations are simply to adapt the
language to the general government instead of the state. It is
believed that those words could have then been found in no other
constitution but that of New York. Only ten years had elapsed
since they were first composed. There cannot be the smallest
doubt that the New York Constitution was before the minds of the
framers of the United States Constitution. If this be conceded,
an important question arises. That instrument specifically pro-
vides that in case of the impeachment of the governor and other
bfficers there shall be a suspension from office until acquittal.
Why was this clause omitted firom the United States Constitution ?
The state constitution proceeds: "In case of the impeachment
of the governor or his removal from qffice, death, or resignation,
&c., the lieutenant-governor shall exercise all the power pertain-
ing to the office of governor," &c.: Art. 20. The United States
Constitution provides, "2I case of the reimoval of the president
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from office, death, or resignation, or inability to discharge the
Towers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on
the vice-president," &e. Everything is copied again, except the
clause concerning impeachment.
Here, in the New York Constitution, was a well-known prece-
dent fixing the right of suspension of office by positive law. The
office of governor devolves, on impeachment, upon the lieutenant-
governor, as in the case of death. Can it be possible that the
authors of the United States Constitution intended a suspension,
and, at the same time, desired to leave the whole matter to a
contest of strength between Congress and the Executive, and at
the first impeachment which happened. to drive the country to
the brink of a revolution ? It will be hard to believe, when the
attention of the eminent lawyers ivho devised that instrument was
dalled to the point, that they failed to provide for it.
But more than this; there is direct evidence that the point was
actually presented in the convention that devised the United States
constitution, and passed upon. It was first suggested by Gouverneur
Morris, who was a member of the convention framing the -New
York constitution. He said: "Is impeachment to suspend the
President's functions ? If it is not, the mischief will go on. If
it is, the impeachment will be merely equivalent to a displace-
ment, and will render the executive dependent on those who are
to impeach :" 2 Madison Papers 1154.
At a later day, having come to a definite conclusion, he in
conjunction with Mr. Rutledge moved that "persons impeached
be suspended from their offices until they be tried and acquitted." I
To this 'Mr. Madison replied: "The President is, made too de-
pendent already on the Legislature, by the power of one branch
to try him in consequence of an impeachment by the other. This
intermediate suspension will put him in the power of one branch
only. They can at any moment, in order to make way for the
functions of another who will be more favorable to their views,
vote a temporary removal of the existing magistrate :" 3 Madison
Papers 1572-3. These wise and pregnant words had their due
influence, and the amendment was rejected by the vote of eight
states to three.
I This is almost a literal reproduction of the language of the 32d Article of the
N. Y. Cons. of 1777.
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There is here the strongest evidence for the conclusion that the
convention (lid not suppose that the power to suspend was inherent
in either branch of the legislature, and that it deliberately in-
tended that the power should not be conferred.
There is an interesting incident in the life of John Adams,
which serves to show that he or the XIfassachusetts lawyers in
1774 did not suppose that the impeaching house had the power
of suspension. He argued that the right of impeachment existed
inherently in the colonial legislature, though there was no mention
of it ifi the charter. He succeeded in inducing the Lower House
oimpeach Chief Justice Oliver. The impeachment was ulti-
mately rejected. No one claimed that the lower house could
suspend Judge Oliver while the impeachment was pending.
What was accomplished was to so act on public7 opinion that no
juryman would take the requisite oath, and thus practically pre-
vent the progress of trials. Mr. Adams says: " Chief Justice
Oliver opened his court as usual. Grand jurors and petit jurors
refused to take their oaths. They never, as I believe, could pre-
vail on one juror to take the oath. I attended at the bar in two
counties and heard jurymen say to Chief Justice Oliver to his
face, IThe Chief Justice of this court stands impeached by the
representatives of the people of high crimes and misdemeanors,
&c. I therefore cannot serve as a juror or take the oath.' The
cool, calm, and sedate intrepidity with which those honest free-
holders went through the fiery trial filled my eyes and my
heart:" 10 Adams's Works 236. Why expose these-brave men
needlessly to this fiery trial and subject them to punishment for
contempt of court, if the power of suspension from office existed
in the impeaching house?
But I have already dwelt too long 'upon this topic, and pass to
a rapid consideration of the other branches of procedure. The
articles of' impeachment having been prepared and the answer of
the accused having been received and 9, reply made, if necessary,
a day is fixed for the trial. The court in England is organized
with a pomp and solemnity befitting the occasion.' The proceed-
ings on the part of the prosecution are conducted by a committee
of the House known as "managers." An opening speech is
I An excellent and graphic de~cription of the court is found in 7 How. S. T.
1194, at the trial of the Earl of Statrord. A. D. 1680.
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made by one or more of them, who in the old reports is said to
"aggravate" the case.'
The trial thenceforward proceeds much in the same way as in
ordinary criminal prosecutions. Counsel represent the accused ;
there is the usual compulsory attendance of witnesses. The rules
of evidence are applied as found in the common-law authorities.
The peculiar arrangements of the English court necessitate much
delay, so that years may elapse in a closely contested case. No
good reason is perceived for the tedious ceremonial of the English
tribunal, except it be to make the avenues to an impeachment
as difficult as possible, and thus to render this class of trials
infrequent.
The rules attending the delivery of the judgment are somewhat
peculiar. Questions which are considered to involve the merits
ISometimes the address of the- manager is of sustained dignity and lofty
eloquence, at other times one is reminded of a so-called "Buncombe" speech in a
modem legislature. England has had in former times her full share of frothy and
noisy declaimers, and the bombast and fustian of their speeches have nowhere been
excelled. I am tempted to give a brief extract from the speech of Captain Mervin
on the impeachment of Lord Chancellor Bolton, of Ireland (A. D. 1640). In the
first place he assembles the Lords around an imaginary death-bed. "My Lords, I
am commanded to present to you Ireland's tragedy, the gray-headed Common
Law's funeral, the active Statutes' death and obsequics. Who sees not the Statute
Laws lying upon their death-beds stabbed by proclamations," &c. To avoid the
smell of mortalityk, he next rushes into the open air. "9 My Lords, having such a
full and rushing gale to drive me into the depths of these occasions, I can
hardly steer and confine my course within the compass of your patience," &c.
Nowv, by a single plunge, he descends to the infernal regions. "My Lords, I
cannot find in any surviving chronology of times, this season, to be paralleled,
which makes me view the records among the infernal spirits, to find if matched
there. The most vehement and traitorous encounter of Satan is deciphered in the
true example of Job: he overthrows not Job's Magna Charta, he disseizes him not
uf his inheiitance, nor dispossesses him of his leases, but only disrobes him of part
of his personal estate; when he proceeds to infringe Job's liberty, he doth not
pillory him, nor cut off his cars, nor bore him through the tongue, he only spots
him with some ulcers. Here Satan stays, when these persons by their.traitorous
combinations envy the very blood that runs unspilt in our veins, and by obtruding
bloody acts will give Satan six ace and the dice2"
But he has not yet reached the depths of the occasion, and mercifully refrains.
He closes. 1M My Lords, this is the first sitting, and I have only chalked out thio
deformed body of High Treason, I have not drawn it at length, lest it might fright
you from the further view thereof." Who shall say after this that there is not
hope for parliamentary eloquence in this country, even in those states where the
American Eagle is still a native. One hundred and fifty years later, the sime
court was charmed with the splendid periods of Burke and Sheridan on the impeach-
ment of Warren Hastings.
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of the case, having been agreed upon, the court is assembled, and
each member is interrogated by the Lord High Steward, or other
presiding officer, in the presence of the accused and the House
of Commons, as to his opinion upon each question. The peers,
commencing with the one lowest in rank, rise successively in their
places as the questions are put, and standing uncovered and
placing their right hands upon their breasts, say " Guilty," or
"1 Not guilty, upon my honor." If a majority are of the opinion
that the accused is not guilty, the impeachment is of course dis-
missed. If found guilty, judgment is agreed upon. The next
step is for the Commons to demand judgment. If they refrain
from this demand, their action is equivalent to a pardon. So,
too, the impeachment may be dismissed for want of prosecution.
In the American practice, there is less formality than in the
English system. After all parties have been fully heard, the
Senate proceed to a consideration of the case. After reaching a
conclusion, the court is assembled for the purpose of giving judg-
ment, and each member rising in his place, answers guilty or not
guilty to each article of impeachment, as the question is put to
him. 'If two-thirds concur in the guilt of the accused on any one
article, the court proceeds to fix the proper punishment. The
details of the practice will be found in Story's Commentaries on
the Constitution, vol. 2, §§ 805-10; Cushing's Law and Practice
of Legislative Assemblies, § 2535, 2570.
The pages of the English State Trials are disfigured by the
details of the revolting punishments which have been inflicted by
the court. In America, the solemnity of the judgment is not
affected by the disgust and horror felt at the barbarity of many
of the English sentences. When the proceedings are conducted
with due impartiality, there can be no more effective and awful
sentence than that an entire nation has pronounced one whom it
has intrusted with a high office, perhaps the highest in its gift,
unworthy of its confidence. The judgment here may not only
exclude the officer from his present office, but may disqualify him
from holding official position in future. It is not necessary that
the two sentences should be combined.
IV. General .emarks-In casting the eye over the long roll
of English impeachments, extending over a period of about five
hundred years, the attention is attracted by the illustrious persons
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who have been called before this most august tribunal of the
English law. Dukes, earls, barons, and commoners, distinguished
judges, lawyers, and authors, prominent statesmen and feeble
women, have either succumbed to or defied the influences which
there surrounded them. In imagination one can recall the Com-
mons scowling and revengeful, the Lords truckling, submissive,
and servile, the victim trembling and faint-hearted as he stood
alone without power of speech or counsel to aid him in his extre-
mity. At other times, the mind reverts to the noble oratory,
with which some tribune of the people brands for ever the mark
of infamy upon the man whom the voice of the nation has already
condemned, and the court only gives form and dignified expression
to the verdict of mankind.
This dramatic period of English history has passed away.
There have been no impeachments for fifty years, and doubtless
will be none of special importance, unless a revolution takes
place. There is "no poitical reason for impeachment at the
present time, as the power of the Commons is never resisted by
a minister or the Executive. In fact, it may be said in a repre-
sentative government, that the absolute cessation of impeach-
ments indicates that the legislative department has triumphed
over the executive and his agents. There are some excellent
remarks upon this topic in May's Constitutional History of Eng-
land, vol. 1., 435, Boston ed., I863.
It is clear, however, that the process of impeachment often
greatly disappoints those who resort to it. At the outset- the
" pomp and circumstance" of the trial flatter the vanity of the
managers by attracting to them the attention of the public- But
the tediousness of the proceeding soon dissipates the interest
-which depends merely upon the novelty of the occasion. Un-
expected difficulties are met with; new- events amiuse or excite
the public. The court is bound by precedents, and must proceed
in accordance with law. At the end the few are convicted and
the many acquitted.
It has been noticed that many of those who have employed
this means to ruin their enemies have themselves, in the muta-
tions of politics, been the victims of similar proceedings. This
point was so forcibly stated by Lord Carnarvon in the only
speech which he ever made in parliament (A. D. 1678), that I
cannot forbear a quotation. The Earl of Danby (Sir Thomas
Osborne) was then before the court. "My lords: I understand
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but little f Latin, but a good deal of English, and not a little
of English history, from which I have learned the mischiefs of
such kind of prosecutions as these, and the ill-fate of the prose-
cutors. I could bring many instances, and those ancient; but,
my Lords, I shall go no further than the latter end of Queen
Elizabeth's reign, at which time the Earl of Essex was run down
by Sir Walter Raleigh. My Lord Bacon, he ran down Sir Walter
Raleigh, and your lordships know what became of my Lord
Bacon. The Duke of Buckingham, he ran down my Lord Bacon,
and your lordships know what happened to the Duke of Bucking-
ham. Sir Thomas Wentworth, afterwards Earl of Straford, ran
down the Duke of Buckingham, and you all know what became
of him. Sir Harry Vane, he ran down the Earl of Strafford,
and your lordships know what became of Sir Harry Vane.
Chancellor Hyde (Lord Clarendon) ran down Sir Harry Vane,
and your lordships know what became of the chancellor. Sir
Thomas Osborne, now Earl of Danby, ran down Chancellor
Hyde, but what will become of the Earl of Danby your lordships
best can tell. But let me see that man that dare run the Earl
of Danby down, and we shall soon see what will become of
him:" 11 Howell S. T. 682, 683.
This most effective little speech saved, for the time being, the
Earl of Danby from a commitment.'
What would be the effect of political impeachments upon our
system of government, it is difficult to say. All analogy leads
to the conclusion that they should be avoided until the last
extremity, and that the trial should be preceded by the unmis-
takable verdict of the people. There is profound wisdom in the
remark of that sound and calm lawyer, Sergeant Maynard, that
"the trial and condemnation of one man at common law will
work more upon people than ten impeachments :" 12 Howell S.
T. 1212. It is the weakness of apoitical tribunal that, whether
justly or.-not, it labors under the imputation of being moulded
by faction; while it is the strength of a common-law court that
every presumption is made by public opinion in favor of its just-
ness and impartiality.
I The reporter adds that the Duke of Buckingham, who was no friend to Danby,
had induced Lord Carnarvon to speak, thinking that as he was heated with wine,
he would say something to Danby's disadvantage. But Lord Carnarvon having
spoken with a remarkable humor and tone, Buckingham was both surprised and
disappointed, and cricil out, " The man is inspired, and claret has done the business."
